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Labour Relations 
in the Public Service 
Manitoba 
H.D. Woods 
In référence with the Manitoba Labour-Management 
Review Committee, the author deals with the problem of pu-
blic employment labour relations and the use of the Review 
Committee as a device to explore a major public policy pro-
blem in industrial relations. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past two years the Manitoba Labour-Management Review 
Committee has been engaged in an examination of labour relations in the 
public sector. In the Spring of 1974 this Committee held a two-day con-
férence to review the contents of a draft report including proposais and 
recommendations. The draft report and its recommendations was later 
revised in the light of the discussion and debate which developed in the 
conférence. The Committee endorsed the revision and submitted the 
amended document to the Minister of Labour for distribution to the 
members of the législature. What happens with it now will be a matter 
for government décision and possible législative action. The Committee 
has completed a phase of its work. 
In this paper I propose to deal with two aspects of this expérience ; 
a) the problem of public employment labour relations ; and, b) the use 
of the Review Committee as a device to explore a major public policy 
problem in industrial relations. As a preliminary step it will be necessary 
to présent a brief sketch of the 1
 W O ODS, H.D., professer, Départ- I 
Review Committee, its genesis, ment of Economies, McGill Univer-
structure, frame of référence, mode | sity, Montréal. j 
* This paper was présentée! to the June 1974 Annual Meeting of the Canadian 
Industrial Relations Research Institute. 
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of opération and some illustrations of the areas of review undertaken 
in the past. The 1973 Report of the Review Committee explains its 
origin and purpose as follows : 
Origin and Background 
« The Manitoba Labour-Management Review Committee was estab-
lished in the Spring of 1964 to undertake a continuing and comprehensive 
review of labour législation and labour-management relations in the 
province. 
The Joint Committee, with equal représentation from labour and 
management, came into being as the culmination of a process which began 
in 1963. Several joint labour-management seminars were held over a 12-
month period which were designed to examine the main aspects of in-
dustrial relations in Manitoba. Labour and management représentatives 
attended thèse sessions, and a consensus developed that the establish-
ment of a permanent Committee representing both parties would make 
a valuable contribution to labour-management relations. In the Speech 
from the Throne of February 1964 the government forecast action of 
this matter. Two months later the Committee was established and its 
existence was unanimously approved by a resolution of the Législature. 
Purpose 
The Joint Committee was designed to fulfill a twofold purpose. It 
was charged with the spécifie responsibility of reviewing labour légis-
lation as embodied in various Acts of the Manitoba Législature. The 
second purpose was to untertake, at the Committee's own discrétion, a 
far-reaching examination of common problems. There was no thought 
that thèse problems would necessarily be solved, but rather that a dis-
cussion of them would lead labour and management to a better under-
standing of each other's point of view. Ultimately such an undertaking 
might lead to an intangible but vitally important improvement in labour-
management relations within the province. There is agreement that con-
sidérable progress has been made on both fronts. 
The Committee consists of a Chairman and Vice-Chairman, and 
twelve nominees each from organized labour and représentative employer 
and business organizations. It functions through a central sub-committee 
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and ad hoc working parties. It makes use of research results ; from time 
to time calls in outside expertise ; holds conférences on spécifie issues ; 
and attempts to reach consensus on various matters with the object of 
making recommendations to the Minister of Labour for conveyance to 
the législature. 
It is important to note the independence of the committee from any 
formai responsibility to the government of the day, as displayed by the 
fact that it détermines the issues it shall examine, and controls its own 
agenda. Its sole formai responsibility is to make a report once a year 
for tabling in the législature. 
It would be misleading, however, to omit référence to the fact that 
there is a close liaison between the Committee and the Labour Depart-
ment. A great deal of secretarial and research assistance is supplied by 
the permanent staff of the Department, and there has always been much 
informai communication, especially between the Chairman and Viee-
Chairman of the Committee on the one hand and the Minister and Deputy 
Minister as well as senior officiais of the Department on the other. It is 
a somewhat unusual situation of collaborative independence and inter-
dependence which seems to work. In any case the Committee was estab-
lished by a Conservative régime and has been continued by their New 
Démocratie successors. 
PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
In 1972 the Committee decided on its own volition to undertake 
an examination of public sector industrial relations in Manitoba. In its 
first discussions it became apparent that Hamlet was being played, not 
only without the Prince of Denmark, but practically in the absence of 
almost the whole Court. Indeed, the Committee possessed only two mem-
bers — a union nominee from C.U.P.E. and a représentative of the Amal-
gamated Transit Workers Union — who were associated with public 
sector industrial relations. It was decided to invite représentation from 
the parties of interest in public employment industrial relations to join 
forces with the Committee members in their proposed examination of 
the problem. 
A conférence was organized to which were invited, in addition to 
the regular members of the Committee, représentatives from the secré-
tariat of the Cabinet, the Manitoba Government Employées' Association, 
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the main Crown agencies and the unions representing Crown agency 
employées, municipalities and their unions including fire fighters and 
policemen, school trustées and the Manitoba Teachers Society, and the 
Manitoba Hospital Association and their appropriate unions. 
The conférence acted as a catalyst and there was unanimous en-
dorsation of the suggestion that the work continue. Bi-partite working 
parties were established covering respectively the areas of a) the civil 
service department, b) municipal employment including police and fire, 
c) hospitals, d) Crown agencies such as Manitoba Hydro and the Liquor 
Commission and e) public schools. 
It might be useful to reflect for a moment on the procédure and its 
meaning for the development of industrial relations policy. The revision 
of labour relations policy is always a treacherous opération for any 
government. Since labour relations are power relations, and since in a 
society which attempts to construct its policies on certain well-known 
fundamental freedoms, logic supports the récognition of a positive rôle 
of légal confrontation which includes the strike and lockout as legitimate 
instruments, it follows that changes in public policy usually tend to shift 
power from one side to the other. Certification and the requirement to 
bargain in good faith undoubtedly transferred power from employers to 
unions, while the banning of strikes and lockouts during the life of an 
agreement tipped the balance in the other direction. In the private sector 
changes in public policy in labour relations is initiated by the government 
and enacted by the législature. Policy changes will usually reflect the 
relative political power relations of organized labour and organized 
business. 
Governments as the « neutral » actors in the private sector power 
conflict frequently resort to various forms of investigation of the problems 
in industrial relations as a preliminary to legislating. Thèse include devices 
such as departmental studies, internai or mixed task forces, trial balloon 
white papers or proposed bills, external task forces, royal commissions, 
or a combination of thèse. Such activities may serve to enlighten the 
government of the day and the legislators, as well as the parties of inter-
est, and consequently may indicate the appropriate direction of légal 
amendment. 
The Manitoba Labour-Management Review Committee differs in one 
important respect from the other investigating devices in that it brings 
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together around a common table représentatives of the parties of interest 
and opérâtes on the principle of accommodation as far as it can. As in 
collective bargaining itself the members of the Committee are negotiating, 
although the Committee has only the power to recommend to the sover-
eign provincial législature. That body décides what labour relations policy 
will be. And just as the Manitoba Government has recognized the inde-
pendence of the Committee, it is clearly recognized also that no sover-
eignty transfer to the Committee has taken place. In my opinion this is a 
wise arrangement. To the extent that the Committee is able to reach a 
consensus, it présents the government with proposais that represent agree-
ment between labour and management in Manitoba. While the govern-
ment is under no formai obligation to legislate in accordance with the 
Committee's recommendations, it is certainly placed in a strong position 
in the législature and with the public if it décides to do so. Incidentally, 
where the two sides of the Committee are not able to agrée on policy 
changes, the government is in no way constrained and may, and indeed 
has, amended the Labour Relations Act without recommendation from 
the Committee. 
The dual rôle of the Government as employer of those who work in 
public service and as the agency formulating public policy in labour 
relations complicates thèse relations in the public sector. It is, of course, 
an oversimplification to say that in this instance the employer as govern-
ment is in a position to establish rules of the game that favour the 
employer against the employées and their unions. Yet American and 
Canadian expérience suggests that this is to a considérable extent so. 
In both countries serious impediments to collective bargaining were 
characteristic until recently ; and indeed full collective bargaining rights 
on the scale found generally in the private sector is almost non-existent. 
Even in those jurisdictions where collective bargaining rights hâve been 
granted to public servants they are usually accompanied by a séries of 
restrictions in one or more areas. Certain groups such as the R.C.M.P. 
in this country are denied the right of unionization. Others such as mu-
nicipal policemen, firemen, school teachers in some jurisdictions, and so 
on, may be granted rights to unionize but are denied the right to strike. 
And in some cases there is no right to arbitration in lieu of the strike. 
There are frequently limits to the scope of bargaining; restraints on 
freedom of association by statutory récognition of government employées 
unions, bargaining units determined by statute, and other limitations. In 
gênerai also the management prérogative in public service employment 
has been protected to a remarkable degree by law. 
8 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 30, NO 1 
This is not to suggest that such limitations are not necessary, but only 
that they exist and that they reflect the governmental authority of the 
state which happens also to be the employer, and which protects itself 
by référence to the sovereignty argument and by appeal to the public 
interest. The record reveals the apparent inconsistency of provincial go-
vernments which as early as 1944 imposed the private sector industrial 
relations model on municipalities but continued to deny it to their own 
employées. 
Students of public employment industrial relations, as well as many 
of the participants on both the employer and employée sides hâve long 
recognized that employment, at least in many areas of the public service, 
differs in varying degrees from that in the private sector. 
The Manitoba Committee recognized the following types of activity 
into which it considered ail goverament functions involving employment 
can be classified : 
(a) government agencies engagea in production or provision of com-
modities or services for sale. The Manitoba Téléphone System, 
Hydro, the Liquor Board are illustrations. Most of thèse agen-
cies are engaged in activities which at one time were wholly 
in the private sector. Generally speaking they are inclined to 
respond to financial or profit constraints in much the same 
way as do private corporations. 
(b) public services made available but not for sale for identifiable 
consumers. Public éducation is perhaps the best example. 
While it opérâtes with budget constraints, generally public 
éducation, unlike the commodities and services in the previous 
category, is not commercially motivated. 
(c) public service to provide facilities for gênerai use but not for 
sale. Streets, highways, street lighting snow removal are illus-
trations. 
(d) public service for the benefit of the whole population. Police 
and fire protection, the courts, and control of pollution may be 
taken as examples. 
(e) public service concerned with research, information and gênerai 
administration. 
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What applies to type (b) is also true of the last three catégories. 
They are concerned with budgets but they are not revenue producers. 
Thus the discipline of the market is absent. 
Of ail thèse types of public employment only the first functions like 
the private sector. Only it is confronted with the problem of operating 
with a profit. Labour relations will resemble those in the private sector 
and collective negotiations will tend to reflect market pressures. But with 
the rest of governement service décisions in the industrial relations area 
are political in the same sensé that public budgets are political. This is 
a fundamental différence between the non-commercial areas of public 
employment and the private sector. And it casts doubt on the validity 
of the private sector model. But by similar reasoning it indicates that 
the private sector model may be valid for the commercially oriented sec-
tions of public employment. 
MODELS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS 
Governments confronted with demands from their employées for the 
rights associated with collective bargaining hâve usually at first opposed 
such demands. The range of possible government positions may run from 
no concession at ail to the granting of ail collective bargaining rights, 
including the right to strike. The possible variations are limitless but the 
Manitoba Review Committee recognized the following types as probably 
encompassing most of the forms found in Canada and the United States. 
No Right of Association 
The terms and conditions of employment are determined by the 
government of the législative body or both, sometimes aided by expertise 
supplied by a civil service commission. This form still persists in some 
jurisdictions in the United States. It is more or less extinct in Canada. 
It is probably unstable because of growing employée unrest. 
Right of Association and Consultation 
Public employées may establish associations which hâve the right to 
meet with the government as employer and présent requests for improve-
ment. There is no right to bargain. This form is unstable because a power 
instrument has been created but the right of employées to use this power 
is denied. It tends to move toward number three. 
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Right of Association and Negotiation 
This goes one very important step beyond the right to pétition. In 
this model actual negotiation takes place with the object of reaching an 
agreement. Failure to do so leaves the government as employer with the 
residual authority to détermine the terms and conditions of work. For 
the employées this model has the advantage over petitioning in that it 
brings in the éléments of bargaining and accommodation, and confronts 
the government with at least a minimal obligation to « justify » its position. 
The employées, denied the right to strike, will seek alternative methods 
of exerting pressure on the government in its capacity of employer. The 
process of collective negotiations tends to become politized and the unions 
or associations are tempted to resort to campaigns for support from legis-
lators and the public. The justifying approach will florish. The model 
is unstable again because a permitted power instrument is denied the 
right to a work stoppage. To the extent that the power of the union is 
more apparent than real, the model will be relatively stable, but with a 
limited tolérance horizon. Since there is no provision for arbitration the 
government as employer still possesses the authority to settle the issues 
if an impasse is reached. 
Right of Association and Negotiation and Arbitration 
This model has the appearance of the previous one but has the very 
important addition of a right to arbitration of unresolved disputes. The 
fear of arbitration results may hâve the effect of encouraging negotiation 
and agreement. But it could hâve the opposite effect if one side believes 
it will get a better resuit by arbitration than by negotiation. The politi-
zation of the previous model is less likely to occur hère because it is 
neither the government nor public opinion that is important, but rather 
the arbitrator. If impasse is reached negotiation with the object of accom-
modation is replaced by a debate over standards and a justifying ap-
proach. Each side will compete for the mind of the arbitrator since by 
définition he is ail powerful. This System will be relatively stable as long 
as the union believes it can, either by negotiation or arbitration, achieve 
results acceptable to those it represents. If this proves impossible or very 
difficult there will be a tendency to engage in working to rule, booking 
off sick, mass résignations and even outright illégal strikes. 
A modification of this model would give the government the author-
ity to reject or modify the arbitration award. Probably such an authority 
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would be difficult to use because it would lead to charges of bad faith. 
It has the virtue of protecting the sovereignty of the government. 
A still further modification might give the authority of rejecting or 
modifying an award to the législature rather than the government. This 
procédure would hardly be necessary since the législature always pos-
sesses such authority and power without spécial législative provision. 
Right of Association, Negotiation and the Strike 
This is the standard private sector model. Its usefulness in the public 
sector dépends upon the extent to which it is compatible with those 
features of public service employment which differ from the normal cir-
cumstances in the private sector. It is to be noted that ultimate authority 
as between the government as employer and the civil service unions is re-
placed by an accommodative process. However, if a distinction is made 
between the government and the législature ultimate authority rests with 
the latter acting as a law-making body. This is the device which has been 
used in some jurisdictions from time to time. The Fédéral parliament as 
well as the législature in Newfoundland, Québec, and Ontario hâve ail 
resorted to this ad hoc device of breaking public interest deadlocks. 
The « strike-right » model is almost entirely absent from the United 
States but has been permitted in practically ail Canadian municipalities 
as well as at least four provinces and the Fédéral jurisdiction. 
It should be pointed out that in some of the strike-right jurisdictions 
the right of a public service union to strike is actually limited in one or 
more ways. There may be limits set on the scope of collective bargaining 
which reserve certain issues for employer (government) détermination. 
This does not deprive the union of the right to strike, but it does limit 
the number of issues over which the work-stoppage is allowed. Indeed 
it removes certain matters from the negotiation area altogether. More 
directly limiting is the provision of « designated » jobs whose occupants 
are denied the right to strike even if the unit in which they are located 
has been called out on a legitimate stoppage. The purpose of this modi-
fication is to guarantee that certain functions considered essential shall 
be continued even while a work-stoppage is in progress. 
Thèse are the principal models we might expect to find in opération. 
They cover a spectrum running from a position in which the employées 
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have no collective rights to the other extrême where they hâve full rights 
of association, negotiation and the use of the work-stoppage weapon. 
Somewhere along that spectrum perhaps can be found the optimum Sys-
tem under présent circumstances, although this should not be taken to 
mean that in Manitoba (or any other jurisdiction) there must be one 
system only to maximize benefits from the industrial relations Systems. 
It may be safely taken as axiomatic that the most appropriate procédure 
for municipalities, will not be the best arrangement for the provincial 
civil service departments. What is appropriate for crown agencies may 
differ from what is best for éducation or hospitals, and so on. There is 
a considérable range of Systems in opération in Canada ; and the var-
iations reflect differing and even conflicting interprétations of the pro-
blems involved in public employment labour relations. 
EXISTING POLICY IN PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN MANITOBA 
Législative policy applicable to public sector industrial relations in 
Manitoba is of two basic types. One extends full bargaining rights on the 
private sector model to ail public service employées except civil servants, 
firemen, and public school teachers. The second, applicable to thèse 
latter groups, provides for compulsory, binding arbitration as the ulti-
mate means of dispute seulement. Prior to 1973 municipal and hospital 
workers were covered by législation originally designed for the private 
sector. In a major revision of that year, policemen and employées of 
crown agencies such as Hydro, the Manitoba Téléphone System, the 
Workman's Compensation Board, the Liquor Commission, and some 
other agencies had extended to them the same full bargaining rights as 
prevailed in the private sector and in the public employment agencies 
mentioned above. While ail of thèse groups had been covered by the 
pre-1973 Labour Act, they were also subject to certain restraining and 
limiting provisions especially with regard to dispute seulement procédures. 
The 1973 amendment abolished thèse spécial dispute seulement procé-
dures and extended to the groups concerned full collective bargaining 
rights including the unmodified right to strike. 
It is important to note that the liberalization of the law by expand-
ing the right to strike to groups to whom it had been formerly denied did 
not include the civil servants proper. But this was in response to the 
représentatives of the Manitoba Government Employées Association who 
at that time preferred the right to arbitration to the right to strike. 
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There were other provisions in the amendments such as extension 
of bargaining rights to certain levels of management, provisions for ne-
gotiations over technological change during the life of an agreement, 
tighter unfair labour practice régulations, and so on. But thèse need 
not involve our attention in this paper. In gênerai the changes indicated 
a policy shift in the direction of the goals of organized labour and in 
accordance with the ideological position of the recently elected New Dé-
mocratie Party. 
It should be noted that the 1973 amendments were initiated by the 
government independently of recommendations from the Manitoba La-
bour-Management Review Committee. It also should be noted that thèse 
amendments were not confined to the public sector, but involved changes 
in policy for both the private and public sectors. Meanwhile the Com-
mittee had entered on its own examination of the public sector alone. 
OBSERVATION, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION 
The Committee and its associâtes from the public sector approached 
the problem more or less de novo. It accepted the basic agreement by 
ail participants that they favoured collective bargaining as the principal 
instrument in resolving industrial relations problems in the public sector. 
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that the existing law as 
amended was ignored in the examination. It was carefully studied but 
was not considered to be a barrier to conclusions which would lead logic-
ally to policy recommendations at variance with existing policies. Indeed, 
there are some recommendations for important policy changes. Thèse 
will be examined below. In the meantime it is important to emphasize 
the independent approach of the Committee. 
In May of 1974 the Committee and its public sector associâtes met 
in a final two-day session at which a draft final report and a séries of 
proposed recommendations were considered. This report and the recom-
mendations were based on the earlier conférence and working-party 
meetings as well as the independent research undertaken on behalf of 
the Committee. 
Approximately forty persons attended the conférence. This was the 
penultimate step before presenting a report to the Minister. The final step 
was approval of the report by the formally appointed members of the 
Committee itself. 
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Ail participants favoured the rétention of collective bargaining as 
the principal instrument for the resolution of conflict in public employee-
employer relations. This does not mean that there was agreement as to 
the appropriate structure of collective bargaining or with regard to the 
best devices for the resolution of impasses. Nor was there consensus on 
the most promising ways of guaranteeing industrial peace and protecting 
the public interest. It does mean, however, that the gênerai Canadian 
approach which has made collective bargaining in the public services 
practically universal is fully endorsed by the participants in this Mani-
toba review. Indeed we can safely recommend on the basis of consensus 
among thèse participants, at least in this one instance, that public policy 
should continue for the foreseeable future to support collective bargaining 
in ail areas of public service employment. An equally important iînding 
which emerged from the Committee's review was the strength of interest 
the parties demonstrated in identifying and discussing ways in which 
they might improve their relationships for their mutual benefit and the 
public interest. 
Thèse two outcomes of the Committee's discussions are the twin 
bases of the most important aspect of the report, that is the great emphasis 
the recommendations place on the parties themselves taking the initiative 
and responsibility for designing their own procédures of collective bar-
gaining, including ways of protecting the public, rather than hâve such 
procédures imposed by law. It is true that failing agreement by the parties 
to negotiate thèse procédures there might be a third-party resolution. 
But, unlike much législation enacted in the past in Canada, the distinctive 
feature of thèse proposais is that they do not take the initiative and res-
ponsibility away from the parties. 
The Administrative Instrument 
Three models of a labour board for the public service were con-
sidered : 
a) the présent board which opérâtes under the Labour Relations Act 
for the private sector, the municipalities and some state agencies ; 
b) a separate public service board unrelated to the existing board — the 
Fédéral and New Brunswick model ; 
c) a public sector panel of the présent board with a chairman and vice-
chairman who would be common with the regular board. The other 
members of the panel would not sit on the regular board. 
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The committee chose the third alternative as providing a degree of 
independence, making it possible to hâve members chosen to function in 
the public sector alone, and yet providing a link with the regular board 
through the common chairman and vice-chairman. 
Associated with this recommendation was the préférence for a com-
mon Labour Relations Act but with a spécial section covering the needs 
and circumstances of public sector labour relations. In this regard, there 
was no strong sentiment in favour of bringing municipal labour relations 
under the proposed new public sector clauses. It will be noted that the 
conférence rejected the separate System and separate législation theory 
of the Fédéral and New Brunswick jurisdictions. 
A proposai inspired by the Fédéral Task Force report that the notion 
of représentatives be discontinued in favour of public members only in 
the sélection of panel members was not received with enthusiasm by any-
one and was consequently dropped. 
The Bargaining Unit Problem 
At the présent time there are certain bargaining unit problems. 
Thèse arise with regard to both the civil service departments and in the 
teaching profession at least. With regard to the former, labour relations 
respecting the civil servants are governed by both the Civil Service Act 
and the Labour Relations Act. The Civil Service Act establishes mem-
bership in the Manitoba Government Employée Association as a right 
of anyone employed in the civil service. It also provides that there shall 
be one global unit for the service and one recognized agent, the M.G.E.A., 
so long as it has the majority support of the employées. There is pro-
vision for récognition of an alternative bargaining agent if the M.G.E.A. 
should lose its majority status ; but the Act empowers the Minister rather 
than the Labour Relations Board to make the change. 
It would appear that this monolithic position of the M.G.E.A. is 
practically unassailable as the law now stands. Nevertheless, the con-
férence agreed to three important recommendations for change. One 
would bring the civil servants and their associations under the jurisdiction 
of the proposed Public Sector Panel of the Board ; a second would open 
the way to fragmentation, by application to the panel, of the existing 
global unit, and a third would make it possible for other associations or 
16 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 30, NO 1 
unions to challenge the M.G.E.A.'s sole bargaining rights. In other words, 
the Civil Service Act provisions regarding the unit and représentation 
would be replaced by the normal certification and bargaining rights pro-
visions of the Labour Relations Act, with the proposed panel being the 
administrative instrument. 
Public school teachers are not included in those covered by the La-
bour Relations Act. Consequently their employment relations privilèges 
and constraints flow from the Public Schools Act alone. Teachers hâve 
the right to join and participate in the Manitoba Teachers Society. There 
is established a Collective Agreements Board which is authorized to deal 
with applications for certification including the détermination of units 
and the majority issue as well. There is provision for the certification 
of M.T.S. locals which means decentralized bargaining. 
The firemen in the province are in a somewhat similar position to 
that of the civil servants in that their employment relations are covered 
by two acts. But in their case they are the Labour Relations Act and 
the Fire Departments Arbitration Act. However, unlike the civil servants, 
the normal bargaining unit and certification provision of the Labour 
Relations Act apply. The provisions of the Arbitration Act will be consi-
dered under impasse resolutions. 
There was much debate on the current circumstances in industrial 
relations in the school System. The Trustées Association has requested 
the Government to introduce régional bargaining units to replace the 
local units. The Manitoba Teachers Society vigorously opposes tins sug-
gestion. The trustées are seeking to reduce negotiation costs and to estab-
lish employer solidarity on a régional basis. The M.T.S. favours the local 
unit to provide direct negotiation with their employers, to combat re-
gionalism, and to forestall any movement toward a province-wide unit. 
The firemen took no formai stand in the meetings on any of the 
major issues but they requested a consultation meeting with the chairman 
and his assistants to explore the issues before committing themselves. 
Such a meeting did take place without further représentations from the 
firemen to the Committee. 
On the question of représentation and bargaining units the com-
mittee recommended as follows : 
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Establishment of Bargaining Units 
(a) The law should permit the establishment of bargaining units based 
on the principle of community of interest among employées and ad-
ministrative logic. This would open the door to the establishment 
of several bargaining units within the provincial civil service where 
now there is one. So far as other employée groups are concerned 
the laws already permit what this recommendation proposes. 
(b) Although the législation should encourage the parties to re-structure 
bargaining units themselves, where they disagree the power to dé-
termine the appropriateness and composition of such units and the 
question of employée support should be vested in either a new 
Public Service Labour Relations Board, or a Public Service Panel 
of the existing Manitoba Labour Board, or the présent Board itself. 
On balance the committee favours the second of thèse alternat-
ives — a panel of the existing Board with a common chairman for 
both panel and Board but with separate members for the panel, 
nominated by the parties. 
(c) The principle of freedom of association and of choice of unions 
justifies the right of replacement of one bargaining agent by another, 
in whole or in part. This well-established principle, long applicable 
to employées in the private sector and to many in the public sector 
as well, the Committee believes should apply throughout the public 
sector. 
(d) With respect to géographie or province-wide bargaining the report 
proposes that the parties themselves attempt to work out mutually 
acceptable arrangements and, where they cannot agrée, considération 
should be given to législation making it possible for eihter a council 
of unions or a council of employer s to apply to the Board panel for 
a redéfinition of géographie scope of bargaining units. In reaching 
its décision the panel should apply the recognized principles of com-
munity of interest and administrative logic and the balance of ad-
vantage or convenience of thèse competing principles. In any case, 
the Committee believes it would be wrong to interfère by législation 
with the position of one side or the other with respect to the déter-
mination of géographie scope of units. 
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The Scope of Bargaining 
In the private sector in Canada there is no législative restriction on 
the range of items subject to collective bargaining. The whole manage-
ment personnel administrative area is within the scope of bargaining. In 
the public sector this is frequently not so. It is usually a goal of public 
administrators to maintain consistency of rules and standards across the 
whole service so that persons performing the same class of work will, as 
nearly as possible be subject to the same terms and conditions of em-
ployment. Where, as is presently the case in Manitoba, the civil service 
is recognized as a single bargaining unit and the M.G.E.A. is the sole 
bargaining agent, the maintaining of consistency is relatively easy, although 
there are problems. But if separate units should émerge (and the pro-
posais regarding appropriate units would make this possible) unrestricted 
bargaining could lead to a crasy-quilt pattern of results. 
Some governments in Canada hâve met this problem by statutory 
exclusions from the scope of bargaining of certain matters where it is 
believed uniformity is too important to allow it to be disrupted by bar-
gaining through independent units. Thus the fédéral law excludes from 
bargaining the application of the merit principle in appointments, ixansfer, 
promotion, lay-off or release of employées ; pension plans, and death 
benefits are also excluded. New Brunswick excludes employée classi-
fication and items that would require législative changes in order to be 
adopted. In British Columbia school teachers appear to be authorized to 
bargain for salaries and bonuses only. In Manitoba, although nothing 
is stated in the législation restricting the scope of bargaining, in practice 
such matters as pensions and group insurance are excluded. 
The conférence called by the joint committee debated the issue of 
scope at great length, and most of those présent appeared prepared to 
accept a compromise proposai which would include such items as classi-
fication, pensions, and groups insurance in the scope of bargaining ; 
would provide for two-tier negotiations on such items where public policy 
favoured uniformity across several bargaining units ; and on thèse issues 
would leave the ultimate détermination with the Government, subject to 
législative endorsation, in case of impasse. 
Scope of Bargaining 
In principle, the Committee believed that pensions, group insurance 
and employée classifications should be negotiable as are pay and other 
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fringe benefits and that where thèse matters affect only one bargaining 
unit, they should be fully negotiable. 
Where two or more separate units are affected by the same plans, 
however, making strikes over thèse issues unworkable, the Committee 
proposes a « two-tier » bargaining System as follows. Negotiations on 
such issues as pensions, insurance and employée classifications should 
be conducted independently of regular bargaining by a council of unions 
and employers. Where impasses occur either party would hâve the right 
to hâve the matter in dispute referred to on impartial technical référée, 
whose authority should be limited to making public recommendations, 
unless the two sides by agreement give him some other mandate. If the 
use of the référée fails to bring agreement détermination would rest with 
the employer side. Though this leaves the final say with the employer 
side the Committee thinks the proposed procédure should ensure full 
considération of the points of view of both sides. It is also suggested that 
the parties might find it useful to involve technical experts from the 
outset. 
This proposai would mean that pensions, for example, could be 
maintained on a uniform formula across the whole civil service as well 
as some Crown agencies, but that a council of unions with bargaining 
rights in their spécifie sphères would hâve thèse rights collectively in 
the second tier areas. In return for this right to negotiate which they now 
do not seem to possess as a practical matter, they would give up any 
claim to the right to strike on thèse restricted issues, with the législature 
being the final arbiter. 
It was also agreed that a similar arrangement was workable in the 
municipal area where in fact multi-bargaining units and several unions do 
exist at présent. 
The report notes that a spécial case is presented by the interest of 
the teaching profession in negotiating matters such as pupil-teacher ratios, 
class size and even educational programming itself. It believes the teacher 
claim for an influence in thèse issues to be valid but questions the use 
of collective bargaining as the means of exerting influence. It suggests 
that the solution lies in the récognition by both central bureaucracy and 
local trustée groups that, next to the students, teachers are the most im-
portant people in éducation and that mechanisms such as continuing 
and ad hoc committees involving the teachers are essential. Otherwîse, 
20 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 30, NO 1 
teacher concern with educational planning and exécution may become 
enmeshed in collective bargaining in which teachers are engaged in pro-
tecting themselves as employées. 
Bargaining and Budgets 
It had been anticipated that there would be sharp controversy over 
the timing and results of bargaining on the one hand and budget-making 
on the other. Yet it did not materialize, the parties of interest displaying 
a remarkable pragmatic calm. The foUowing statement by the conférence 
was endorsed. 
Budget décisions are made in a political context. Collective negotiations 
cannot be insulated from this fact. Moreover, the timing may influence 
the results. If it is established by law that bargaining results must 
conform to predetermined budget provisions, bargaining will be cir-
cumscribed by législative action taken without the benefit of the 
results of bargaining. On the other hand, if bargaining is concluded 
before budgets are determined, the pressure on the legislators to bud-
get sufficiently to meet the commitment of public funds made in 
bargaining will be strong. On balance it would seem wise to avoid any 
statutory linking of bargaining and budget-making. This is a political 
burden which should be determined in the political arena. The way 
should be left open for collective bargaining to influence the législa-
ture. At times this may lead to embarassment of government negotia-
tors or of governments. Nevertheless, this is probably less damaging 
than the frustrations of fixed limitations on negotiations, which hâve 
been determined by législative action. Procédures should be maintamed 
which make possible a reasonable accommodation of the legitimate 
aspiration of public servants and the political responsibilities of govern-
ments and legislators. A predetermined statutory relationship between 
budgets and collective bargaining should be avoided. 
Third Party Intervention 
There was a gênerai consensus in the conférence in favour of re-
taining the conciliation officer stage, but in the context of the présent 
Labour Relations Act which divorces conciliation from the date of ac-
quisition of the right to strike. Conciliation boards were unpopular al-
though the delegates were not opposed to the right of the parties jointly 
to request a conciliation board. Some sentiment was expressed particularly 
by union représentative in favour of vesting the appointment of con-
ciliation officers with the propose Public Sector Panel of the Board. In this 
way the conflict of interest which would be suspected in appointments 
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by the Minister of Labour would be avoided. On the whole, however, the 
conférence was prepared to accept conciliators appointed by the Minister 
provided the conciliator did not engage in public reporting or recom-
mendations. It was suggested that if the parties should jointly request a 
conciliation board and were unable to agrée on a chairman the Chairman 
of the Public Sector Panel shoud undertake the responsibility of appoint-
ments. 
The Commission of enquiry should be retained in the hands of 
the Minister in the public interest. It was recognized that such an appoint-
ment goes beyond the simple interest in dispute resolution and is in fact 
a political act. 
The Conférence gave some attention to the appropriate approach 
of third parties and endorsed the following : 
« 1. The conciliation officer's rôle should be toward bringing the 
parties to agreement. He should make no public recommendations. His 
mandate should continue until either he is withdrawn from the case or 
there is a seulement. Once assigned to a dispute he should be empowered 
to call any meetings of the parties he deems necessary and they should 
be obliged to cooperate with him. 
2. The conciliation board (should one be granted on the request of 
both parties) should take its direction from the parties. They might jointly 
ask it to : 
a) merely médiate without formai recommendation ; or 
b) attempt médiation but on a failure to achieve a settlement make 
non-binding recommendations ; or 
c) avoid médiation and go directly to factfinding without recom-
mendations ; or 
d) engage in factfinding and non-binding recommendations ; or 
e) act as an arbitration board voluntarily accepted by the parties. » 
Reasoning behind this unusual recommendation is that since it pro-
poses that conciliation boards should be appointed only when both parties 
are agreeable, they should also jointly détermine its terms of référence and 
its method of opération. In other words the parties would control the 
instrument rather than that they should be bound or limited by statutory 
requirements. 
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Data Available to the Negotiating Parties 
The conférence recognized the probability of greater reliance, in 
public sector bargaining and settlements, on objective criteria and com-
munity standards than on simple acceptability as in the private sector, 
where bargaining power normally will be expected to play a major rôle. 
Under the circumstances availability of accurate information becomes 
crucial in public sector bargaining. The Committee recommended that 
the existing work of the Department of Labour in data collection be 
expanded perhaps along the lines of the Pay Research Bureau of the 
fédéral System, to assist the negotiators or any intervenors who might 
become involved. 
The Strike Issue and the Résolution of Impasse 
Before dealing with the strike isssue in the public sector it is ne-
cessary to outline the légal provisions for dispute resolution provided for 
the private sector in the revised Labour Relations Act. 
The first point to emphasize is that the right to strike does not 
hinge on any particular stage of conciliation. In the case of a newly cer-
tified union the right to strike accrues to the union 90 days after the 
date of certification. In the case of bargaining for the renewal or amend-
ment of an agreement the strike right is acquired by the union on the 
termination date of the expiring agreement. This arrangement was intro-
duced into the law in order to eliminate the unfavourable effects on col-
lective bargaining of the former suspension of the work stoppage right 
associated with compulsory conciliation stages. As a means of further 
encouraging bargaining the amended law permits a party to give notice 
to bargain 90 days prior to expiration rather than the former 60 days. 
The Minister, under thèse constraints, may assign a conciliation 
officer in the usual way, and he may also appoint a conciliation board, 
although this device has a matter of policy practically disappeared from 
Manitoba. Carried over from the previous law also is the provision by 
which the two parties may jointly request the Minister to appoint a me-
diator of their own choosing. The Minister has no option but to meet 
the joint request ; and the mediator replaces the conciliation officer. This 
provision was formerly practically enver used, but recently it was suc-
cessfully applied in at least one public employment case and interest in 
it may be rising. 
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A new provision in Section 112(1) provides that the Minister, where 
he deems it expédient, may hâve enquiries carried out regarding industrial 
matters, and may do such things as seem calculated to maintain or secure 
industrial peace and to promote conditions favourable to the seulement 
of disputes. This imprécise language has not yet been tested in practice, 
let alone in the courts. At first blush it would appear to grant very ex-
tensive powers to the Minister. 
Another unusual clause in Section 70 of the Act endorses the prin-
ciple of voluntary arbitration by providing that the parties may include 
in their agreement an arbitration clause to résolve any negotiation im-
passe the next time around when they are re-negotiating an agreement. 
However, either party may refuse to hâve such a clause carried forward 
to the new agreement, and this décision, in spite of the arbitration agree-
ment, is not arbitrable. 
Thèse provisions outlined above apply in the private sector. They 
also apply without qualification to hospital workers, municipal employées 
(except firemen) policemen and employées of a number of crown agen-
cies. In contrast to many jurisdiction in Canada there are no spécial 
législative provisions for thèse various classes of public service employées. 
There are three important exceptions to the gênerai coverage of 
public sector employées by the Labour Relations Act of Manitoba. 1 ) As 
indicated earlier some years ago the M.G.E.A. requested that their ne-
gotiations with the Provincial Government be subject to compulsory arbi-
tration. The Civil Service Act was so amended. 2) With regard to fire-
men, the Fire Departments Arbitration Act of 1954 established com-
pulsory arbitration and a prohibition of the strike. 3) The Public Schools 
Act similarly dénies to teachers the right to strike, and impasse com-
pulsory arbitration is the conventional three-man board, where requested 
by either party. Let us return to the proposais of the Review Committee. 
The Manitoba record of successful resolution of negotiation disputes 
in the public sector has been remarkably good, and in récent years there 
has only been one strike, légal or otherwise. It might therefore be argued, 
on the principle of leaving well enough alone, that there should be no 
constructive purpose in considering whether or not there should be policy 
and therefore législative changes. But the Committee decided otherwise 
on the basis of the expérience in other jurisdictions and on knowledge 
of considérable stress in at least some areas of the public sector in the 
province. 
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The gênerai question of the right to strike was explored and, with 
a few important exceptions, there was support for the idea that the right 
should be extended as widely as posisble. Among those three groups now 
denied access to the strike there was évidence of considérable ambi-
valence. The position of the firemen remains obscure. The teachers hâve 
a problem of a division within their ranks, partly because of the tra-
ditional reluctance of professionals regarding withdrawal of services, 
partly because of the attitude of certain religious groups among their 
membership, and partly because of their calculated appraisal of bar-
gaining power vis a vis arbitration. As noted earlier, until recently the 
M.G.E.A. representing the civil servants of the province hâve supported 
their right to arbitration rather than the strike. Undoubtedly the global 
bargaining unit, and récognition of their limited power in bargaining are 
influences supporting this policy. Yet dissatisfaction with a récent arbi-
tration award has apparently shifted some members in the direction of 
the right to strike so that a small majority now seeks an amendment in 
the law to grant the M.G.E.A. the right to strike. 
The conférence moved in the direction of establishing a gênerai right 
to strike but with retaining the privilège of the right to arbitration as 
well, and with built-in protections for the public in certain situations. The 
strike was recognized as one means of resolving negotiation impasses. 
It was proposed that the right to strike should be extended to ail 
public service employées independently of the right to arbitration. It was 
recognized that the présent unlimited right in the private sector and in 
certain public sector areas can be maintained and could probably be 
extended into areas where the right is denied and arbitration is imposed. 
It was also recognized that some limitation might become necessary to 
protect the public in certain cases. Efforts of the Committee and in the 
Conférence to define emergency and vital public interest failed as it has 
always failed. Certain options were considered. 
One proposai would introduce the practice of designating non-
strikable jobs broadly to cover the whole spectrum of public service 
employment under the jurisdiction of the proposed Public Sector Panel. 
However a change from the fédéral arrangement of désignation would 
make this an issue to be negotiated between the employer and the union, 
with the Panel having the final say in case of deadlock in the negotiations. 
It was felt by some that there would be a better chance of agreement 
this way than if the employer submitted a proposed list to the Panel sub-
ject to challenge by the union. 
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There was support for the view that a désignation device on a bar-
gaining basis could be applied so as to eliminate the need for législative 
prohibition of the strike in any area. It is true that in security opérations 
a high percentage of désignation might be necessary, yet it would leave 
open the possibility of légal strikes, even if in some cases they might be 
token. This was considered to be better than a statutory prohibition. 
The Committee also proposée that the parties negotiate the level and 
location of picketing, subject again to décision by the Board panel in lieu 
of agreement. 
Consistent with the proposai to designate certain jobs which must 
be manned even during a strike, the Committee believed that the em-
ployer should refrain from carrying on the functions of those employées 
who are legitimately witholding their labour in a work-stoppage. 
With regard to the breaking of impasses, there was some criticism 
of the fédéral provision which grants to the union the power to impose 
arbitration on the employer. Some felt that the New Brunswick system, 
without the conciliation board requirement, had more to justify it than 
the fédéral scheme. To begin with it makes arbitration a choice of both 
parties, secondly it brings the time of décision up to the time of impasse, 
thirdly it keeps open three possibilities, largely in the hands of the mem-
bers of the unit ; the parties may reach agreement, they may agrée to 
arbitrate, the unit may authorize strike action. 
The main proposai of the Committee with respect to the problem of 
resolving impasses was that either side hâve the right to impose final offer 
arbitration, a system of arbitration in which the arbitrator must choose 
between the two packages of proposais, one submitted by the employer 
and one by the bargaining agent. 
The Committee explained that this proposai has several advantages. 
It would probably overcome the problem of one side refusing to bargain 
seriously with the other because it would be under pressure to avoid the 
imposition of arbitration in which the other side's proposais might very 
well be selected. There would also be an inducement to the parties to 
negotiate a settlement themselves right up to the point of décision of the 
arbitrator because, once knowing the « final offer » the other side has 
submitted to the arbitrator, they might see something in their own pro-
posais they would wish to revise in light of what the other side is pro-
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posing and in fear that it might appeal to the arbitrator. The very nature 
of the « final offer » arbitration System would also tend to prevent its 
use and to induce parties to bargain to settlements themselves. 
The proposai is in keeping with the whole emphasis in the report 
that bargaining by the parties is vastly préférable to législative inter-
férence and imposed settlements. 
Additional Recommendat/ons 
The Committee emphasized that there is need for the parties in 
collective bargaining to assume greater responsibility for the évolution of 
procédures designed to make collective bargaining work effectively and 
to the public advantage. This means 1) communication between the 
parties should be maintained at a high level ; 2) the parties should assume 
initiative within, but independently of législative requirements ; 3) ex-
périmentation ; 4) the parties should maintain a continuing program of 
self-education either on a partisan basis, but preferably jointly, to keep 
abreast of experiments and thinking in public employment industrial 
relations elsewhere. 
The préférence of certain groups of employées for arbitration should 
be respected but by procédural agreement between the parties rather than 
by law. 
The Committee recommended a program for the development of 
arbitrators, possibly including the establishment of a panel of arbitrators 
who would be available to the parties who choose arbitration as a method 
of seulement or may hâve it imposed by law. 
Finally, the Committee recommended that considération be given to 
establishing an on-going committee on public sector industrial relations 
simïlar to the Manitoba Labour-Management Review Committee itself. 
The idea was strongly recommended by some of the parties of interest 
that it would provide an on-going vehicle for joint communication. Since 
the publication of the Report the Minister of Labour has invited the 
Committee to submit to the Government proposais for the composition 
and procédures of a public sector joint committee. This is now (Decem-
ber 1974) being done. 
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CONCLUSION 
While agreement on many of thèse issues and others not reported 
was not reached, there was a substantial consensus on certain broad prin-
ciples. There was a strong belief that the issue of the right to strike is 
not very important, but that making collective bargaining work is. There 
was a gênerai belief that public policy should be framed in such a form 
as to put pressure on the parties to assume the responsibilityfor pro-
tecting the public. It should also remove barriers to inventive innovation 
in procédures for the resolution of problems. Hence the emphasis of 
negotiating such things as the designated list and the form of picketing. 
Hence also the proposai for a Public Sector Joint Committee. 
What the Government and législature of Manitoba will do with the 
recommendations is a matter for the future. In the meantime, this unusual 
expérience of joint study and recommendation by the parties of interest, 
who are by the nature of their relationship in continuous conflict, has 
been fruitful in a number of ways. It has been éducative to ail participants. 
It has deepened knowledge of the problems and increased understanding 
of the nature of public sector employment. It has advanced for considér-
ation by the Government, the législature and the public a set of proposais 
for public policy and administration based on certain principles which 
emerged during the exercise itself. It appears to hâve opened the door 
to a continuing instrument, the proposed Public Sector Joint Committee, 
which should guarantee that the initiative undertaken by the existing 
joint committee will be followed up with vigor. 
Les relations de travail dans la fonction publique au Manitoba 
En 1964, le gouvernement du Manitoba institua un comité de révision des 
relations de travail formé de douze représentants nommés par la Fédération du 
travail du Manitoba et de douze représentants désignés par le monde des affaires 
et les principales associations d'employeurs de la province. Ce comité comptait 
aussi parmi ses membres un président et un vice-président qui étaient au service 
des écoles de science sociale de deux universités. Deux fonctionnaires du Ministère 
du travail avaient la responsabilité du service des recherches et du secrétariat, 
mais ils ne faisaient pas partie du comité. 
Le comité avait un double objectif : réviser la législation du travail et s'en-
tendre sur des recommandations qui devaient ensuite être soumises au ministre du 
travail et, par son entremise, au gouvernement et à l'Assemblée législative ; entre-
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prendre, de sa propre initiative, des études suivies et approfondies des problèmes 
courants. Au cours de ses dix années d'existence, le comité a formulé un nombre 
considérable de recommandations dont plusieurs furent introduites dans les lois 
avec ou sans modifications. 
Le présent article traite d'un ambitieux programme d'études sur les relations 
du travail dans le secteur public entrepris en 1972 et qui résulta dans la présen-
tation d'un rapport fort élaboré au gouvernement à la fin de l'été de 1974. Deux 
aspects de ce rapport sont fort intéressants pour les étudiants et les spécialistes en 
relations du travail : la question des relations du travail dans le secteur public 
sans doute, mais peut-être encore davantage la méthode d'étude et de révision 
utilisée en introduisant dans les relations du travail au Manitoba un instrument 
de travail original qui allait s'avérer un adjuvant pour l'administration publique. 
Le comité de vingt-quatre membres avait été institué à une époque où l'ac-
tualité politique s'intéressait surtout aux problèmes du secteur privé. Il n'y avait 
donc pas à s'étonner si tous ses membres du côté des employeurs appartenaient à 
l'industrie privée et si les représentants de l'élément travail venaient presque tous 
de syndicats engagés dans les négociations dans le secteur privé. Aussi pour se 
pencher sur les questions propres au secteur public, le comité invita les employeurs 
et les syndicats de ce secteur à se joindre au comité à titre de spécialistes. Presque 
tous répondirent à l'appel avec enthousiasme de sorte que ce sous-comité réunissait 
un groupe de cinquante à soixante personnes représentant tant les employeurs que 
les salariés, qui venaient des municipalités, des commissions scolaires, des services 
de policiers et de pompiers, des services de santé, des agences de l'État et de la 
fonction publique proprement dite. 
Le comité ainsi élargi recourut à tout un ensemble de méthodes de travail : 
conférences plénières, ateliers de travail, contrats de recherche indépendants, études 
et factums du secrétariat, etc. On étudia d'une façon approfondie les relations du 
travail dans le secteur public. Les textes juridiques et les services mis en place 
dans les provinces canadiennes et ailleurs furent mis à la disposition de tous les 
membres du groupe. On fit circuler parmi eux toute une série de pièces statis-
tiques. Enfin, on leur distribua un avant-projet du rapport qui fut discuté dans 
une dernière réunion plénière. 
Récrit et approuvé par le comité original, le projet fut transmis au ministre 
du travail qui en saisit l'Assemblée législative. 
En ce qui a trait à la substance même du rapport, quelques points sont parti-
culièrement intéressants. Tous les participants étaient favorables à la négociation 
collective comme instrument principal de règlement des conflits d'intérêts dans 
les services publics. Il n'y eut aucune pression pour interdire l'exercice du droit 
de grève dans aucun des champs d'activité. On admit qu'il fallait tenir compte 
de l'intérêt public et des différends susceptibles de créer une situation d'urgence. 
Dans l'ensemble, on inclinait vers la reconnaissance du principe de l'établissement 
de fonctions essentielles analogues à ce qui est prévu dans la Loi sur les relations 
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de travail dans la fonction publique fédérale. Cependant, on était fortement d'ac-
cord pour affirmer que l'établissement des fonctions essentielles était une matière 
de négociation qui, en cas de désaccord, serait tranchée par une section des ser-
vices publics de la Commission des relations de travail dont on recommandait la 
formation. 
Un second trait caractéristique du rapport, c'est l'accent que les parties ont 
mis sur leur volonté d'assumer leurs responsabilités plutôt que de s'en remettre 
au gouvernement ou à ses agences. Aussi, s'intéressait-on moins à la grève en soi 
qu'à la négociation collective et à la découverte de mécanismes sous leur contrôle 
qui les aideraient à atteindre des compromis tout en assurant au maximum la pro-
tection de l'intérêt public. 
Quelques exemples permettent d'apprécier la saveur du rapport. Une recom-
mandation précise fort importante demande au gouvernement d'établir un comité 
conjoint permanent pour le secteur public. Le ministre du travail fut d'accord 
et demanda au comité d'en déterminer les fonctions. Cet organisme convoqua une 
nouvelle conférence des personnes qui avaient participé aux discussions qui avaient 
abouti au rapport qui recommanda que le comité de révision paritaire original 
soit restructuré de façon à former un comité constitué de deux sections : l'une 
regroupant des représentants du domaine privé et l'autre ceux des services publics. 
L'issue de tout ce travail dépend des mesures que le gouvernement voudra 
adopter pour encadrer les relations du travail dans les services publics. 
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